

OF SHEEP AND WARRIORS. THE MILITARY PROWESS AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PROVINCIAL ELITES IN CICERO'S LETTERS FROM CILICIA

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Abstract: According to Suetonius, Tiberius told governors who were suggesting to impose burdensome taxes on the provinces, that ‘it was the part of a good shepherd to shear his flock, not skin it’ (*Tib.* 32.2). Such a paternalistic approach was deeply rooted in the mentality of senators of the late Republic and early Empire: provincials were (almost) harmless subjects whom governors had to protect, rather than abuse. As it is well known, Cicero clearly shared this perspective. This paper will deal with some remarks on military matters and provincial elites included in his correspondence as governor of Cilicia. As a matter of fact, even if he styled himself as an exemplary governor and boasted the enthusiastic support of Cilician communities, provincials played a minor role in his correspondence, whose outlook is strikingly similar to Tiberius’. Especially regarding military matters, the governor did not credit the provincials with giving a significant contribution to the defence of their province and his later success against the tribes of the Amanus mountain. As we shall see, the actual reality of Cicero’s campaign in Cilicia reveals the role played by the provincials and their elites in keeping under control and defend their home regions. Cicero was possibly unwilling to admit that the local elites were needed to protect the Mediterranean empire, as this conclusion could have practical consequences on their political standing. Cicero’s (and Tiberius’) words are deceptive: the leading men of the provinces were much more than a flock of sheep, and the extent of their actual influence still awaits to be fully recognised.

Keywords: Cicero, Cilicia, Provincial Elites.

SOBRE OVELHAS E GUERREIROS: PROEZAS MILITARES E RELEVÂNCIA POLÍTICA DAS ELITES PROVINCIAIS NAS CARTAS DE CÍCERO DA CILÍCIA

Resumo: Segundo Suetônio, Tibério disse aos governadores que sugeriam impor taxas extorsivas às províncias, que “cabe ao bom pastor tosar seu rebanho, não o esfolar” (*Tib.* 32.2). Tal visão paternalista estava profundamente enraizada na mentalidade dos senadores da República tardia e do principado: os provinciais eram sujeitos (quase) inofensivos a quem os governadores tinham de proteger, e não abusar. Como se sabe, Cícero partilhava dessa visão. Este artigo lidará com algumas observações sobre questões militares e elites provinciais em sua correspondência como governador da Cilícia. De fato, mesmo que Cícero apresentasse a si mesmo como um governador exemplar e propalava gozar do entusiástico apoio das comunidades da Cilícia, os provinciais têm um papel limitado em sua correspondência, cuja visão geral é muito similar à de Tibério. Especialmente no que tange a questões militares, o governador não reconhece aos provinciais uma contribuição significativa na defesa da sua província e em suas vitórias contra as tribos do Monte Amanus. Como veremos, a realidade da campanha de Cícero na Cilícia revela o papel dos provinciais e de suas elites na manutenção do controle e defesa da sua região. Possivelmente, Cícero não estava disposto a admitir que as elites locais precisavam proteger o império mediterrâneo, o que levou a consequências práticas em sua posição política. As palavras de Cícero (e de Tibério) são enganosas: as lideranças provinciais eram muito mais que um rebanho de ovelhas, e a extensão de sua real influência ainda precisa ser plenamente reconhecida.

Palavras-chave: Cícero, Cilícia, Elites provinciais.

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According to Suetonius, Tiberius told provincial governors, who were suggesting imposing more taxes on the provinces, that ‘it was the duty of a good shepherd to shear his flock, not skin it’.² In defining the provincials as a flock of sheep, and himself – the emperor – as a benevolent shepherd, Tiberius echoed imperial propaganda, which bestowed on the *princeps* the duty to take care of the subjects of the empire.³ But the emperor also gave voice to a sincere belief: provincials were harmless subjects whom governors had to protect, not abuse. Tiberius owed such a point of view to Stoicism and its cult of *continentia* and *mansuetudo*, self-restraint being so important for people provided with supreme authority.⁴ Some decades earlier Cicero had fully shared that point of view: the welfare of the provincials depended entirely on senatorial governors, their integrity and moderation. According to Cicero, the Roman Empire had long been a *patrocinium orbis terrae* – a benevolent form of domination, but by his time, it had become an *imperium*, where subjects had to obey in fear.⁵ In his letter to Quintus on the eve of his third year as proconsul of Asia, Cicero indulged in depicting the good governor as an almighty guardian, interested in keeping the people of his province happy and prosperous – *sit provinciae cognitum tibi omnium quibus praesis salutem, liberos, famam, fortunas esse carissimas*.⁶ As C. Steel has pointed out, according to Cicero, the problems of provincial administration depended solely on inept or corrupt individuals. As benevolent as it appeared, this approach was somewhat disingenuous. At the end of his governorship, Cicero himself decided to abandon the Salaminians to the unlawful and unfair greed of Cato,⁷ and in the same letter to Quintus, paternalism left space for the true nature of any empire: the Greeks should stop complaining about taxes and publicani; the empire protected them from foreign wars and civil strife, and they had to pay to keep it working.⁸ Perpetual peace came at the cost of their subjugation. In this political narration, there was hardly any space for military prowess on the part of the provincials, and as we shall see, Cicero’s correspondence as governor of Cilicia seems to confirm this assumption.⁹

² Suet. *Tib.* 32.2. The emperor was not new to such animal metaphors, as he was credited a most suggestive consideration on the dangers attached to the supreme authority: he was ‘holding the wolf by the ears’ (Suet. *Tib.* 25.1).

³ Syme 1986, 440.

⁴ Brunt 1975.

⁵ Cic. *De off.* 2.20-29; Steel 2001, 192-197; see also Lintott 2008, 232-245.

⁶ Cic. *Q. fr.* 1.1.13; see also 1.1.22; *Verr.* 2.5.39; *Leg.* 3.6; *De re publ.* 28.40; 31.43; Steel 2001, 72-74.

⁷ Cic. *Att.* 5.21.10-13; 6.1.5-7; 6.2.7-9; Campanile 2001, 263-272 (with bibliography).

⁸ Cic. *Q. fr.* 1.1.34: *illud Asia cogitet, nullam ab se neque belli externi neque domesticarum discordiarum calamitatem afuturum fuisse, si hoc imperio non teneretur; id autem imperium cum retineri sine vectigalibus nullo modo possit, aequo animo aliqua suorum fructuum pacem sibi sempiternam redimat atque otium.*

⁹ Along with Pliny’s letters to Trajan, Cicero’s correspondence during the governorship of Cilicia is one of the few extant literary sources dealing with the day-to-day activity of a Roman governor, and as such has duly received much scholarly attention. To name the most recent contributions, see Bérenger 2014; Osgood 2018.

Over the years, the contribution of the *socii* to the Roman military apparatus has received much scholarly attention.¹⁰ On the contrary, scholars have often overlooked the involvement of provincial elites in Roman military affairs, apart from them being expected to provide Republican armies with auxiliary cohorts, ships, food, fodder, and money. These contributions often represented a significant burden on civic treasuries and local elites,¹¹ but even obligations might offer opportunities for negotiation and be beneficial for both parties.¹² In this regard, scholars have often assumed that foreign *clientelae* did not affect Roman politics before the civil wars.¹³ In fact, in a recent volume which aimed at revising E. Badian's seminal book *Foreign Clientelae*, J. Prag has pointed out that through their bonds with prominent Roman statesmen, local elites in Italy and the provinces had been a factor in the military apparatus of the Late Republic well before those troubled decades¹⁴. The Augustan creation of a permanent army then overshadowed the military relevance of the leading men of the cities of the empire, as the institution of permanent auxiliary cohorts almost barred the formation of independent provincial forces.¹⁵ Some literary sources support this conclusion, as according to Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom, to live in peace the Greeks had to relinquish their ancestral right to the wage war.¹⁶ C. Brélaz has devoted much attention to this problem in the cities of Asia Minor and concluded that even in a pacified empire, local elites jealously kept their military traditions as part of their cultural heritage.¹⁷ As we shall see, military affairs also offered them the opportunity to achieve political acknowledgement and concessions from Roman authorities.

Cilicia – ‘au carrefour des empires’¹⁸

Cicero’s correspondence as the ‘reluctant’ governor of Cilicia has received much scholarly attention.¹⁹ On the contrary, his province – an ‘elusive entity’ according to R. Syme²⁰ – deserves some preliminary remarks.

¹⁰ E. g. Late Republic: Prag 2011a; 2011b; 2015; early Empire: Haynes 2013; Eck 2016.

¹¹ Brunt 1974 = 1990.

¹² On so-called Game Theory, see Binmore 2007.

¹³ Badian 1958.

¹⁴ Prag 2011a.

¹⁵ Arist. *Or.* 26.76; See Brélaz 2005, 28.

¹⁶ Plut. *De Pythiae oraculis* 28.408 B-C.; Dio Chr. *Or.* 31.104; 161.

¹⁷ Brélaz 2005; 2008.

¹⁸ Mutafian 1988.

¹⁹ Cic. *Att.* 5.15.1: *lucem, forum, urbem, domum, vos desidero;* 6.3.2: *odit enim provinciam, et hercule nihil odiosus, nihil molestius;* *Fam.* 2.12.2: *urbem, urbem, mi Rufe, cole et in ista luce vive!* *omnis peregrinatio, quod ego ab adulescentia iudicavi, obscura et sordida est.* A. Lintott (2008, 253) has aptly labelled Cicero as ‘the reluctant governor’.

²⁰ Syme 1939, 299.

Cilicia became an area of interest for Roman politics in 102 BC, when M. Antonius (*cos. 99*) successfully (even if not conclusively) campaigned against the pirates.²¹ Pompey's arrangements in the East were a major event in the region²² and Cicero claimed that it was Pompey who provided the Republic with the whole of Cilicia.²³ As a matter of fact, the provincialization process was accomplished only later, under Vespasian.²⁴ Apart from Cilicia proper, Cicero's province included Cyprus, Pamphylia, Isauria, Phrygia Paroreia, Lycaonia, and – even if controlled by kings in friendly terms with Rome – Cappadocia and Galatia. According to J. Osgood, 'despite its vastness, in fact [it] was little more than a glorified road, a highway running across southern Asia Minor, in part developed centuries earlier by the Persians'.²⁵ This definition possibly fits how Cilicia appeared to the Romans,²⁶ but not the actual reality of a composite landscape. To focus on Cilicia proper, Cilicia *Tracheia* lay in the mountainous region of the West; infamously renowned for piracy and brigandage,²⁷ the region hosted the independent sanctuary of Olba and smaller communities, almost out of Roman control.²⁸ Even during the Imperial Age, the region enjoyed cultural and economic bonds with Caria, Cyprus, and the Aegean islands – former Ptolemaic possessions in Asia Minor. In the eastern part of the province, Cilicia *Pedias* was densely populated, and its fertile plains were intensively farmed. The region enjoyed significant political, economic, and cultural relations with Syria under the Seleucid and Roman rule.²⁹ The rise of the Parthian empire increased the strategic value of the region, which C. Mutafian has aptly described as 'in the crossroads of empires'.

In 51 BC, the Senate (and Cicero's) attention was mainly focused on the borders with Cappadocia and Syria. Crassus' defeat on the plains of *Carrhae* gave them reason to fear a Parthian invasion of Syria and/or Asia, and the imperial defence apparatus was unprepared – to say the least – against this threat. Even if Cilicia was less exposed than Syria, Cicero had to

²¹ Freeman 1986.

²² Cicero duly acknowledged Pompey's merits in the *Pro Flacco* (30): *illa enim est gloria divina Pompei, primum praedones eos qui tum cum illi bellum maritimum gerendum datum est toto mari dispersi vagabantur redactos esse omnis in <populi Romani> potestatem, deinde Syriam esse nostram, Ciliciam teneri.*

²³ Cic. *Man.* 35: *totam ad imperium populi Romani Ciliciam adiunxit; omnes qui ubique praedones fuerunt partim capti interfectique sunt, partim unius huius se imperio ac potestati dediderunt.*

²⁴ Borgia 2017.

²⁵ Osgood 2018, 147.

²⁶ Cicero's opinion on that road was in turn very contemptuous (*Att. 5.14.1*): *iter conficiebamus aestuosa et pulverulenta via. (...) habes epistulam plenam festinationis et pulveris* (written in Tralles).

²⁷ On Cilician pirates and Pompey's campaigns against them, see De Souza 1999, 97-178; see also De Souza 2008, devoted to Roman responsibilities in the 'development of piracy' in the Eastern Mediterranean.

²⁸ Hoff, Townsend 2013.

²⁹ Desideri 1991.

defend the Taurus and the Cilician Gates, which still represent the easiest ways to access Asia Minor from Syria and Mesopotamia.³⁰

War in Cilicia

There is no need to discuss in full Cicero's disingenuous correspondence with his predecessor Ap. Claudius Pulcher (*cos.* 54; *cens.* 50), in leaving Italy and reaching Cilicia.³¹ It is worth stressing the uncertainty surrounding the decision-making process regarding military affairs, which in turn forced Cicero to rely on the *socii*. Pulcher and the senior members of his staff represented the most reliable source of information for Cicero and the Senate. One of them, the legate Q. Fabius Vergilianus, came to Italy in May 51 to bring the *patres* an alarming report on behalf of Pulcher, who recommended strengthening the garrisons in Cilicia through a levy of fresh troops in Italy – *praesidio firmiore opus esse ad istam provinciam*.³² According to Cicero, the *patres* agreed with this proposal, but the consul Ser. Sulpicius Rufus strongly opposed it, asking the promagistrates to depart as soon as possible.³³ In the meanwhile – rather incongruously – Pulcher meant to disband his troops, even if Vergilianus told Cicero that all the cohorts were still at full strength.³⁴ So, in the end, the governor had to leave Italy without levying more troops, and with hardly any hint on the composition and size of his forces.³⁵

In a letter written in Tralles at the end of July, he informed Atticus that Pulcher had very recently suppressed a mutiny in the army, paying the soldiers the arrears up to July 15th.³⁶ Some days later, when he entered his province in Laodicea, Cicero eventually realized that his forces were legions in all but names.³⁷

³⁰ On this see also Cic. *Att.* 5.20.2: *ex his castris, cum graves de Parthis nuntii venirent, perrexi in Ciliciam per Cappadociae partem eam quae Ciliciam attingit, eo consilio ut Armenius Artavasdes et ipsi Parthi Cappadocia se excludi putarent. Cum dies quinque ad Cybistra [Cappadociae] castra habuisse, certior sum factus Parthos ab illo aditu Cappadociae longe abesse, Ciliciae magisiminere. itaque confestim iter in Ciliciam feci per Tauri pylas.*

³¹ Campanile 2001; Cafaro 2021, 119-123.

³² Cic. *Fam.* 5.3.1: *Q. Fabius Vergilianus, legatus tuus, mihi praestiti fuit, eaque me ex tuis mandatis monuit, quae non modo mihi, ad quern pertinebant, sed universo senatui venerant in mentem, praesidio firmiore opus esse ad istam provinciam.*

³³ Cic. *Fam.* 5.3.1: *id cum Sulpicius consul passurum se negaret, multa nos quidem questi sumus, sed tantus consensus senatus fuit, ut mature proficisceremur, parendum ut fuerit; itaque fecimus.*

³⁴ Cic. *Fam.* 5.3.2: *mihi Fabius idem demonstravit, id te cogitasse facere, sed cum ipse a te discederet, integrum militum numerum fuisse.*

³⁵ As a proconsul, Pulcher had two legions at his disposal. It seems hardly plausible that he was disbanding Roman legions when a Parthian offensive seemed obvious, and the cohorts being ordered to stand down were possibly auxiliaries. The disbandment of auxiliaries had precedents even in time of war (e. g. Liv. 44.20).

³⁶ Cic. *Att.* 5.14.1: *seditio militum sedata ab Appio stipendumque eis usque ad Idus Quintilis persolutum.*

³⁷ Cic. *Att.* 5.15.1: *et, cum exercitum noster amicus habeat tantum, me nomen habere duarum legionum exilium!* On this, see also: *Fam.* 15.4.4; 15.2.1.

In September, Cicero wrote two detailed letters to the Senate. In the first, the governor informed the *patres* that according to trustworthy allies – Tarchondimotos, son of Strato, ruler of Hierapolis-Castabala – ‘the most loyal ally and friend of the Roman people beyond the Taurus’ – and Iamblichus, phylarchus of the Arabs – the Parthians had crossed the Euphrates, invading northern Syria. As a result, a serious revolt immediately broke out there.³⁸ This is the first time the *socii* appeared in his correspondence – and apart from local dynasts, not for good. In fact, even if he relied on his moderation and honesty – *mansuetudinem integritatemque* – to encourage the *socii*, he stated that all of them were naturally worried and feared an invasion and a dramatic change in the balance of power in the region – *socios infirme animatos esse et novarum rerum exspectatione suspensos*. In Cilicia – most probably around the Taurus and the Amanus – some already took arms against Rome; Cicero thus resolved to march on the Taurus to quell any upheaval – *Ciliciam autem firmorem fore*.³⁹ These comments seem at least exaggerated. In fact, the formal and informal meetings Cicero had to attend when he entered the province, suggest that contacts with indigenous and especially local elites were ongoing from the governor’s first steps in Asia and Cilicia.⁴⁰ Despite the Carrhae disaster, local elites were keeping their communities under control and by then no major revolt was underway. The governor concluded his first message to the Senate, suggesting the *patres* should commit adequate military resources to the East and commenting that a local levy would be pointless: the *provinciales* were few in number and almost useless on the battlefield, while the *sociorum auxilia* had been weakened by Pulcher’s harsh treatment.⁴¹

A few days later, while encamped near Cybistra, in Cappadocia, Cicero wrote a letter to inform the *patres* about his diplomatic efforts with allied kings: Deiotarus tetrarch of Galatia, who promised to join Cicero with his forces (I will focus on this later), and Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia.⁴² While he was there, waiting for fresh news about the Parthians, Cicero sent a squadron of cavalry to Cilicia *Pedias*. He clearly intended to quell any rebellion and ensure the

³⁸ Cic. Fam. 15.1.2: *Tarcondimoto, qui fidelissimus socius trans Taurum amicissimusque populi Romani existimat*ur.

³⁹ Cic. Fam. 15.1.3: *intelligebam socios infirme animatos esse et novarum rerum exspectatione suspensos (...) Ciliciam autem firmorem fore, si aequitatis nostrae particeps facta esset: et ob eam causam et ut opprimerentur ii, qui ex Cilicum gente in armis essent, et ut hostis is, qui esset in Syria, sciret exercitum populi Romani non modo non recedere iis nuntiis adlati, sed etiam propius accedere, exercitum ad Taurum institui ducere.*

⁴⁰ Cic. Att. 5.13.1; 5.14.2; 5.15.1-2; 5.16.3; Fam. 3.8.4;

⁴¹ Cic. Fam. 15.1.5: *quamobrem autem in hoc provinciali delectu spem habeatis aliquam, causa nulla est: neque multi sunt et diffugiunt, qui sunt, metu oblato et, quod genus hoc militum sit, iudicavit vir fortissimus M. Bibulus in Asia, qui, cum vos ei permisissetis, delectum habere noluerit. nam sociorum auxilia propter acerbitatem atque iniurias imperii nostri aut ita imbecilla sunt, ut non multum nos iuvare possint, aut ita alienata a nobis, ut neque exspectandum ab iis neque committendum iis quidquam esse videatur.*

⁴² Cic. Fam. 15.2, esp. 2-8.

loyalty of local communities – *cum in loco castra haberem equitatumque in Cilicia misissem, ut et meus adventus iis civitatibus quae in ea parte essent nuntiatus firmiores animus omnium faceret.* This sentence suggests the existence of a negotiation on a double level: of course, Cicero could impose Roman rule by the presence of his army, but that simple fact did not exclude that there was space for diplomacy. In 49, on the eve of the civil war, Pompey sent his *praefectus fabrum* Vibullius Rufus to *Picenum confirmandorum animorum causa* – an ill-fated mission which nevertheless aimed at strengthening bonds with local elites and recruiting troops against Caesar.⁴³

At the end of August 51, Cicero sent a letter to Cato.⁴⁴ The message was brief and somewhat inconsistent with the governor's correspondence thus far, as Cicero vowed to defend his province by means of his capabilities as governor and *sociorum fides* – *i. e.* thanks to the same allies whose loyalty he had put into question.

A longer letter to Cato, written in January 50 BC, when military affairs were almost over and Cicero was hoping for a triumph, is very informative about the preceding months.⁴⁵ I will discuss it along with other shorter messages. According to Cicero, when he entered the province, his forces were dangerously scattered throughout Phrygia and Lycaonia to face an unspecified revolt – *cumque ante adventum meum seditione quadam exercitus esset dissipates.* It seems that Pulcher did not inform the Senate about it. In any case, five cohorts were stationed in *Philomelium* without any commanding officer – *sine legato, sine tribuno militum, denique etiam sine centurione ullo* – while the rest of the army was encamped in Lycaonia.⁴⁶ These were the same units that had mutinied under Pulcher and had only recently been paid their arrears. Remarkably, Cicero did not mention any trouble on the part of the provincials, despite the presence of unruly soldiers in the region. Cicero's first military decision was thus to abandon the area – which did not represent any threat – and collect all the available cohorts in Iconium.⁴⁷

Then, Cicero resorted to levying some troops among the Roman veterans and local communities – *cum interea superioribus diebus ex senatus consulto et evocatorum firma<m> manum et equitatum sane idoneum et popul<or>um liberorum regumque sociorum auxilia*

⁴³ Caes. BC 1.15; on Vibullius Rufus and his *praefectura fabrum*, see Cafaro 2021, 131-136.

⁴⁴ Cic. Fam. 15.3.2; the message was written in Iconium.

⁴⁵ Cic. Fam 15.4.

⁴⁶ Cic. Fam. 15.4.2. The expression *seditione quadam* suggests that Pulcher failed to inform the Senate and/or his successor about these troubles.

⁴⁷ Once there, Cicero realized that he still missed three cohorts at full strength and had to ask Pulcher about their fate. Eventually, Cicero discovered that those cohorts followed Pulcher to Tarsus (Cic. Fam. 3.6.5: *in tanta militum paucitate abesse tres cohortes, quae sint plenissimae, nec me scire, ubi sint*).

*voluntaria comparavissetem.*⁴⁸ This measure was perfectly sound, but still at odds with what Cicero had told the Senate in September.

Fresh news from the Syrian border changed everything. Cicero's praetorian cohort and the cavalry, stationed as garrison in Epiphaneia – *praesidii causa* – defeated and repulsed a Parthian detachment. Since the enemy could be reasonably kept under check by Roman forces in Cilicia and Syria, Cicero informed Deiotarus that he did not need his troops.⁴⁹ The governor then hurried to Epiphaneia to launch a full campaign against the tribal communities on the Cilician side of the Amanus, 'eternal enemies of the Romans' – *pacare Amanum et perpetuum hostem ex eo monte tollere*.⁵⁰ This operation of colonial policing was efficiently carried out by legions and auxiliaries – *distributisque cohortibus et auxiliis* – under Cicero's command.⁵¹ Then, the governor besieged *Pindenissus*, the stronghold of the otherwise unknown Free Cilicians – *Eleutherocilices* – which surrendered to him 57 days later, on the first day of the *Saturnalia*, 'with no little personal exertion, without causing any trouble or expense to our allies'.⁵² In those days, good news from Syria reached Cicero: C. Cassius Longinus (*pr. 44*) had scored a major victory over the Parthians.⁵³ These events concluded the military season, as other communities of that border region accepted to bow to the Roman forces without a fight. As we have seen, an active participation of local levies is attested, even if Cicero did not credit any merit to the *socii* who provided him with men, resources, and sensitive information.⁵⁴ Tarchondimotos, who ruled '*trans Taurum*', was possibly among them, while the siege of Pindenissus – almost two months long – could not simply be carried out without supplies and fodder offered by local communities, most probably by Mopsuestia. The city – the most important in the region – stood on the river Pyramos and commanded the fertile plains on the eastern edge of Cilicia *Pedias*.⁵⁵ Cicero also spent some days *in agro Mopsuestiae* in October,

⁴⁸ Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.3; the same right was granted to Bibulus, who eventually chose not to levy troops in Syria (15.1.5). Such decrees were not at all formal: in 171 BC, a *senatus consultum* forbade Greek communities from complying to the orders of Roman commanders, unless they were coherent with the decree itself (on this, see: Livy. 43.17.2: during the same year, Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius, who had been sent as ambassadors into Greece, read, first at Thebes, and afterwards carried to all the other states of Peloponnesus, a decree ordering that "no person should furnish the Roman magistrates with anything for the use of the war, except what the senate should determine; Polyb. 28.13.11; 28.16.1).

⁴⁹ Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.7: *Deiotarum confestim, iam me advenientem cum magno et firmo equitatu et peditatu, et cum omnibus suis copiis, certiorem feci, non videri esse causam, cur abesset a regno.*

⁵⁰ Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.8.

⁵¹ Cicero was assisted by all his legates: his brother *Q. Cicero*, *C. Pomptinus* (*pr. 53*), *M. Anneius*, and *L. Tullius*.

⁵² Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.10: *magno labore meo sine ulla molestia sumptuve sociorum.*

⁵³ Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.7; see also 2.10.2; *Att.* 5.20.3; 5.21.2; Dio Cass. 40.28.3-29.3.

⁵⁴ J. Prag (2011b, 27 and fn. 66) has also noted the absence of any reference to the *auxilia* in relation to the allocation of the booty among Cicero's soldiers (Cic. *Att.* 5.20.3-5).

⁵⁵ The city hosted a diocese and is now located in the municipality of Yüreğir (Adana); on this, see D'Agata, Salmeri 2012.

immediately before the operations on the Amanus.⁵⁶ A significant contribution to the Roman army would not be surprising, as Mopsuestia together with Epiphaneia abandoned the Macedonic calendar and adopted a new civic era as early as 68-67 (followed by Soloi-Pompeipolis in 67 and Mallus in 66 – both cities were located nearby), thus suggesting a strong bond with Pompey and the Romans.⁵⁷ In any case, Cicero did not mention any help neither on the part of Tarchondimotos nor of the Mopsuestians. As noted by A. M. Riggsby, while claiming his victory over Pindenissus, Cicero made the same use of the first-person narrator as in Caesar's *Commentarii*: the general is the main character of the ongoing war, even to the detriment of the legions and the *auxilia*.⁵⁸ Their mention would overshadow Cicero's individual *virtus*.

With the end of the military season, Cicero ordered the army to be dismissed and quartered in the recently conquered or more suspected *vici* – *in vicis aut captis aut male pacatis exercitus collocaretur*.⁵⁹ He thus spared the provincial communities in Cappadocia, Lycaonia, and Phrygia to billet his men. As a reminder of Cicero's bias, the governor presented this choice as an act of selfless generosity.⁶⁰ As we have seen, those regions were reasonably safe and had already hosted the bulk of Pulcher's army in previous year(s).

At any rate, the successes on the Amanus and the surrender of Pindenissus earned Cicero the coveted title of *imperator* and the hope of receiving a triumph, once back in Rome.⁶¹ This aspiration was strengthened by the fact that despite the weakness of his army the governor claimed to have succeeded 'in converting the most disaffected allies into the most devoted, the most disloyal into the most trustworthy' – this result, which no legion could have achieved, should be credited to his policy of self-restraint and moderation.⁶² To persuade Cato, Cicero called the allies – especially those bound to Cato – as witnesses: *Cyprus insula, Cappadociae*

⁵⁶ Cic. *Fam.* 3.8; see also 2.9.

⁵⁷ Jordan 2021, 22.

⁵⁸ Riggsby 2006, 195-205, esp. 197: 'The army typically makes no appearance, nor does the general even "see to" (*curare*) waging war (as is not uncommon for civilian building projects). It is as if he fought the wars himself'.

⁵⁹ On this, see also Cic. *Att.* 5.20.5; 5.21.6.

⁶⁰ Cic. *Att.* 5.21.6; the Cypriots (!) used to pay 200 Attic talents to avoid being asked to billet Roman forces.

⁶¹ The operations on the Amanus, the conquest of Pindenissus, and Cicero's request for a *supplicatio*, the anti-chamber of a triumph, dominate quite a few letters, including Cic. *Fam.* 15.4; see also *Fam.* 8.11.1-2; 15.5.2; 15.6.1-2; *Att.* 7.1.7. Cicero's hopes were bolstered by Bibulus' failure on the other side of the Amanus (on this, see: Cic. *Att.* 5.20.3, 5; 7.2.6; *Fam.* 2.10; 8.6.4; 12.19.2).

⁶² Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.14: *si in mea causa considerabis, reperies me exercitu imbecillo contra metum maximi belli firmissimum praesidium habuisse aequitatem et continentiam: his ego subsidiis ea sum consecutus, quae nullis legionibus consequi potuissem, ut ex alienissimis sociis amicissimos, ex infidelissimis firmissimos redderem animosque novarum rerum exspectatione suspensos ad veteris imperii benevolentiam traducerem.*

*regnum, rex Deiotarum.*⁶³ This last comment is remarkable in many ways. Which role did the *socii* play in Cicero's military operations?

The *socii* in Cicero's Correspondence: a Question of Quality

Even if Cicero did not mention any provincial community, most of his *auxilia* were recruited in his *provincia*. In a letter to Atticus, written at the end of his governorship, in June 50 BC, Cicero gave a brief description of the forces at his disposal.⁶⁴ According to the governor, his army was still weak – *exercitum infirmum* – but well-supported by *auxilia* – *auxilia sane bona*. This expression is not surprising, as the Republican ruling class was aware of the actual military significance of the allies.⁶⁵ In the Verrines, Cicero himself lamented that Verres had undermined the Roman control over the seas, when he exempted *Messana* from its obligation to provide the Republic with a ship,⁶⁶ and in 55, he blamed L. Calpurnius Piso (*cos. 58*) for having waged an illegal war against the *Denselatae*, who had been loyal allies of the Romans thus far, turning those ‘eternal defenders of Macedonia, into bandits and brigands’.⁶⁷ Even if Cicero recognized the role played by the *auxilia* in the defence of the empire and ultimately in his army, he added some detrimental words: ‘but they are Galatian, Pisidian, and Lycian *auxilia*, these are our strengths’ – *haec enim sunt robora nostra*. The ethnic origin of his men seemed critical in defining the army’s weakness and the need for proper military forces to be recruited in Italy.

This dismissive opinion about the quality of the allied troops was not new, as the use of auxiliaries as ‘cannon-fodder’ and the allegation of proneness to desertion and betrayal are well documented in literary sources. According to Frontinus, when one of his auxiliary units had been annihilated, Sulla claimed that he purposely put it in a place of danger, since its men plotted to desert;⁶⁸ during the Mithridatic war, Lucullus pursued some Macedonian auxiliaries up against the enemy’s first line, forcing them to fight; allegedly, they were going to desert.⁶⁹ During the Second Celtiberian war (154-151), the auxiliary cavalry provided by the

⁶³ Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.15.

⁶⁴ Cic. *Att.* 6.5.3: *etsi exercitum infirmum habebam, auxilia sane bona sed ea Galatarum, Pisidarum, Lyciorum (haec enim sunt nostra robora), tamen esse officium meum putavi exercitum habere quam proxime hostem quoad mihi praeesse provinciae per senatus consultum licaret.*

⁶⁵ A full list of mid- and late-republican occasions for trouble-levies (which mainly involved auxiliaries) is in Prag 2011b, 18 fn. 14. At p. 19 n. 19, Prag also lists garrisons manned by auxiliaries in Sicily and Macedonia.

⁶⁶ Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.50.

⁶⁷ Cic. *Pis.* 84: *ita perpetuos defensores Macedoniae vexatores ac praedatores effecisti; vectigalia nostra perturbarunt, urbes ceperunt, vastarunt agros, socios nostros in servitutem abduxerunt, familias abripuerunt, pecus abegerunt, Thessalonicensis, cum oppido desperassent, munire arcem coegerunt.*

⁶⁸ Front. *Strat.* 2.7.3.

⁶⁹ Front. *Strat.* 2.7.8.

Nergobriges (100 men strong) attacked M. Claudius Marcellus' (*cos.* 166) rearguard, allegedly because some of them did not know of the agreement with the Romans.⁷⁰ Even Caesar had reason to fear the auxiliaries' actual loyalty: in *BG* 1.42, while assembling his escort to meet Ariovistus, he replaced the Gallic auxiliaries' horsemen with Roman legionaries, because he did not want to entrust his life to Gauls.⁷¹ More could be said about the alleged low quality of the levies among local communities. In 88 BC, C. Cassius and king Nicomedes tried to assemble and train some auxiliary forces in Phrygia: even if they desperately needed men, they had to abandon any hope of drilling 'their newly collected mob of artisans, rustics, and other raw recruits'.⁷² So fundamental to the Roman empire as they were, the *auxilia* were almost hidden in the centre of power. As noted by J. Prag, they were consistently excluded from Roman triumphs.⁷³ Therefore, Cicero's low opinion of his allies' military prowess was common in Rome⁷⁴. More importantly, by underestimating the military value of his troops – both Roman and native – he could boast even greater military accomplishments.

During his last days in Cilicia, Cicero revealed his many contradictions. In a letter to Atticus, written in June 50 BC, he lamented the general situation of his province: a great war still looming in Syria, brigandage in Cilicia, difficulties in provincial administration.⁷⁵ He did not want to leave the province to his brother, especially since he feared the dangers of war and the unreliability of the army – *bella periculum, militum improbitas*. A month later, on the eve of his departure, Cicero changed his mind. Since he had already chosen his successor – most probably the worst possible one⁷⁶ – he was interested in downsizing any possible risk. In a letter to Cn. Sallustius, proquaestor of Syria, he even defended his decision to dismiss the garrisons in Apameia and elsewhere, as Pulcher had done one year earlier.⁷⁷

The *socii* in Cicero's Correspondence: a Matter of Loyalty

As we have seen, according to Cicero's narrative, the loyalty (and effectiveness) of the allies solely depended on his personal authority and self-restraint. Their treatment is also

⁷⁰ App. *Iber.* 48.

⁷¹ Caes. *BG* 1.42.5: *neque salute suam Gallorum equitui committere audebat*.

⁷² App. *Mithr.* 19.74-75.

⁷³ Prag 2011b, 24-28.

⁷⁴ After all, in 51 the *patres* were prepared to allow a levy in Italy to face a Parthian invasion. In a letter to Cicero (November 51), Caelius admitted that his forces were inadequate to the task of defending the province (*Fam.* 8.10.1), but one cannot exclude that Caelius intended to flatter the governor, showing his full support in a difficult situation.

⁷⁵ Cic. *Att.* 6.4; see also 6.3.2: *hic praesidi nihil sit*.

⁷⁶ Cicero's choice fell on the new quaestor C. Coelius Caldus; Cic. *Fam.* 2.15.4; 6.6.3-4; 7.1.6; see also *Att.* 6.3: *quaestorem nemo Dignum putat; etenim est levis, libidinosus, tagax*.

⁷⁷ Cic. *Fam.* 2.17.3; see also Cic. *Att.* 6.5.3.

somewhat inconsistent and certainly deserves caution. D. R. Shackleton Bailey resolved some inconsistencies in the governor's correspondence, stating that Cicero employed the term *socius* to include both the non-subject allies and the natives from provincial communities (*civitates stipendiariae* and *foederatae* alike).⁷⁸ For instance, this could well explain Cicero's words in *Att.* 5.18.1-2. In that letter, the governor overstated his difficult situation and lamented (once again) the weakness of his army – *infirmitate exercitus* – and the lack of loyal allies – *inopia sociorum, praesertim fidelium*.⁷⁹ These should be intended as the non-subject allies. A few lines later, Cicero claimed that even if his forces were few in number, they were in high spirits, a levy of Roman citizens was ongoing, and he could count on Deiotarus.⁸⁰ In addition to this, the governor claimed that the *socii* helped the Romans in greater numbers than ever before – *sociis multo fidelioribus utimur quam quisquam usus est*,⁸¹ Here, the *socii* are clearly the provincial subjects. I think Shackleton Bailey's explanation is conclusive. Still, the different treatment of the *socii* suggests some additional remarks and a further inconsistency seems to arise: all in all, were provincial communities and their elites loyal or not?

As we said, on the one hand, there were non-subject allies. Cicero did not mention civic communities, but only kings. Apart from unnamed dynasts, the list included: Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia; Tarchondimotos, ruler on the Mount Amanus;⁸² Antiochos I, king of Commagene; Iamblichos, phylarchos of the Arabs;⁸³ Deiotarus, tetrarch of Galatia. All of them were politically (and some even economically) in debt with Pompey.⁸⁴ As we have seen, with the notable exception of Deiotarus, none of the kings could effectively contribute to the Roman military effort but might offer strategic information of the utmost importance.⁸⁵ Deiotarus was different in many respects.⁸⁶ His army – 14,000 men strong – was modelled on Roman legions

⁷⁸ Shackleton Bailey CLA 222; see also Shackleton Bailey CEF 439.

⁷⁹ Cic. *Att.* 5.18.1: *nobis enim hac infirmitate exercitus, inopia sociorum, praesertim fidelius, certissimum subsidium est hiems.*

⁸⁰ As we have seen, this piece of information also appeared in a letter to Cato (*Fam* 15.4).

⁸¹ Cic. *Att.* 5.18.2: *tuto consedimus copioso a frumento, Ciliciam prope conspiciente, expedito ad mutandum loco, parvo exercitu sed, ut spero, ad benevolentiam erga nos consentiente. quem nos Deiotari adventu cum suis omnibus copiis duplicatur eramus. sociis multo fidelioribus utimur quam quisquam usus est; quibus incredibilis videtur nostra et mansuetudo et abstinentia. dilectus habetur civium Romanorum; frumentum ex agris in loca tuta comportatur.*

⁸² Cic. *Fam.* 15.1.2: *Tarchondimoto, qui fidelissimus socius trans Taurum amicissimusque populi Romani existimatur.*

⁸³ Cic. *Fam.* 15.1.2.

⁸⁴ Magie 1950, 389-390; provincial issues and the attitudes to be adopted towards kings and communities had surely been at the core of a three-day meeting held in Tarentum with Pompey, just before Cicero's departure (*Fam.* 5.5.2; 5.7.1); on the kings' allegiance to Pompey, see: Caes. *BC* 3.4; App. *BC* 2.49

⁸⁵ Cic. *Fam.* 15.1.6: *Regis Deiotari et voluntatem et copias, quantaecumque sunt, nostras esse duco. Cappadocia est inanis. reliqui reges tyrannique neque opibus satis firmi, nec voluntate sunt.*

⁸⁶ Cicero sent his son and nephew at his court – undisputable evidence of trust (*Att.* 5.17.3; 5.18.4).

in its organization, weapons, and training.⁸⁷ According to the governor, his counsel and resources – *consilium et opes* – could be most beneficial for the Republic, and his friendship should be preserved as a valuable asset.⁸⁸ Years later, Cicero defended Deiotarus claiming he had been his ‘soldier in Cilicia’⁸⁹ and ‘the sole truly loyal man to the Roman people’.⁹⁰ In any case, Cicero deemed Deiotarus’ help unnecessary and did not mention any actual contribution on the part of other kings.

On the other side, there were Rome’s subjects. Provincial communities (and their elites) were required to contribute to the defence of the province, by means of men, money, and supplies.⁹¹ Still, Cicero totally omitted their contribution. Despite the governor’s silence, provincial elites helped him in many ways. First, they provided the Roman army with fresh recruits and supplies throughout the military season. Second, with the notable exception of some tribes located near the Syrian and Cappadocian borders, civic communities did not fail Rome. The Republic suffered great losses at the hands of civic communities switching sides: Vaga in 109 BC, Asia in 88, Cenabum in 53, to name a few.⁹² In this regard, the consequences of the first Mithridatic war had hastened the process of integration in the imperial structure. Even those who suffered Sulla’s retaliation had to strike up stable relationships with the Roman ruling class,⁹³ and Lucullus and Pompey were the earliest pivotal political figures to consistently commit themselves consistently to a policy of pacification. Regarding the latter, his personal historian and political advisor, Theophanes of Mytilene, was granted Roman citizenship in front of Pompey’s troops.⁹⁴ Most probably, apart from his literary merits, he led some of his fellow-citizens in support of the Romans. Mytilene had endorsed Mithridates and had to thank Cn. Pompeius Theophanes for being pardoned by Pompey.⁹⁵ It does not seem that Cicero consistently developed such a policy while governor in Cilicia. He claimed to have saved

⁸⁷ On the composition of Deiotarus’ legions, see Cic. *Att.* 6.1.14: *habet autem cohortis quadrigenarias nostra armatura XXX, equitum C10 C10*; on the king’s promises, see also *Att.* 5.17.3; 5.18.2; 20.9; *Fam.* 15.4.5. As is well known that army later became a proper Roman legion (on this, see Keppe 1990); for a similar instance, see Tac. *Hist.* 3.47.2; Brélaz 2005, 28.

⁸⁸ Cic. *Fam.* 15.2.2: *Deiotarum. fidelissimum regem atque amicissimum rei publicae nostrae, maxime coniunctum haberem, cuius et consilio et opibus adiuvari posset res publica.*

⁸⁹ Cic. *Deiot.* 28: *hic vero adulescens qui meus in Cilicia miles, in Graecia commilito fuit, cum in illo nostro exercitu equitaret cum suis electis equitibus quos una cum eo ad Pompeium pater miserat.*

⁹⁰ Cic. *Phil.* 11.34: *in toto orbe terrarum ex animo amicum vereque benevolum, unum fidelem populo Romano (...) ab eodem rege adiuti sumus et equitatu et pedestribus copiis.*

⁹¹ E. g. the contribution of the allies to set up the fleet, are discussed in Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.60; *Flacc.* 27; on Crassus’ demands to the allies on the eve of his disastrous Parthian adventure, see Plut. *Crass.* 17.9.

⁹² *Vaga:* Sall. *BI* 66.3-69.4; Plut. *Mar.* 8.1-5; App. *Num.* 8 fr. 3; *Asia* (e. g.): App. *Mith.* 22-23; Plut. *Sull.* 24.7; *Pomp.* 37.4; *Cenabum:* Caes. *BG* 7.3.

⁹³ Santangelo 2007.

⁹⁴ Cic. *Arch.* 24.

⁹⁵ On Theophanes as a member of Pompey’s inner circle, see Santangelo 2018; on Theophanes, see also Cafaro 2021, 141-151.

provincial communities from bankruptcy and famine and granted the cities judicial autonomy – a most coveted concession – but all in all, his treatment of the Greeks is paternalistic and contemptuous.⁹⁶ When he presented the financial crisis of the cities, he claimed that it was their magistrates' fault; they were the first to embezzle money and then did not pay the publicans their dues.⁹⁷ Even if everyone could get access to his person, Cicero refrained from accepting any gift under any form and forced the men in his *consilium* to follow his example.⁹⁸ He even made impossible for Ap. Claudius Pulcher to receive any honours⁹⁹. In this regard, J. Richardson has rightly stressed that this policy would not be appreciated by everyone.¹⁰⁰ In fact, by refusing gifts he was staying aloof from provincial politics. It is thus not surprising that we could name only two provincials whose bond with Cicero dated back to his governorship in Cilicia: Andron, son of Artemon, who hosted Cicero in Laodicea,¹⁰¹ and Antipater of Derbé, in Lycaonia.¹⁰² Regarding the latter, Strabo called him brigand or pirate and tyrant, ruling over the mountainous regions of Derbé and Laranda. According to R. Syme, he should be identified as Antipater son of Perilaus who brokered an agreement between the Temenothyreans and the Romans in 49. Caesar's victory barred him from being called 'rex', but in the end he embodied a local power, as the 'robber-chief' Cleon of Gordiucome, to whom Augustus conferred the priesthood of Pontic Comana as a reward for his loyalty.¹⁰³ When Cicero crossed 'his' land, Antipater probably helped the governor marching with his troops to reach Cybistra unscathed. Years later, Cicero had to ask Q. Marcius Philippus (*pr. ante* 47), by then governor in Cilicia, for mercy on behalf of Antipater's sons; they had been kept as prisoners or hostages. I have not, thus far, discussed brigandage. It is worth stressing that in Cicero's correspondence it appears as a major concern. Cicero launched a minor campaign against a certain Moeragenes,¹⁰⁴ while in Laodicea, and even his operations against the tribes of the Amanus could be seen as a fight against banditry, as summarized by the treatment of Cicero's governorship in *Vir. ill.* 81.3: *praetor Ciliciam latrociniis liberavit*.¹⁰⁵ In fact, it was a struggle for control over land and

⁹⁶ Cic. *Att.* 5.21.8; 6.1.14: *sibi libertatem censem Graeci datam, ut Graeci inter se disceptent suis legibus.*

⁹⁷ Cic. *Att.* 6.2.4-5: *mira erant in civitatibus eorum furtæ Graecorum quae magistratus sui fecerant.*

⁹⁸ Cic. *Att.* 5.10.2; 5.14.2; 5.16.2; 5.20.6; 5.21.5.

⁹⁹ Cic. *Fam.* 3.7.2-3; 3.8.2-5

¹⁰⁰ Richardson 1994, 596-597; Steel 2001, 198.

¹⁰¹ Cic. *Fam.* 13.67; Deniaux 1993, 446, nr. C6

¹⁰² Cic. *Fam.* 13.73; Strab. 12.1.4; 12.6.3; IGR III, 1694; See Syme 1939, 308-313 = 1979, 128-131; Deniaux 1993, 453-454, nr. C12.

¹⁰³ Strab. 12.8.9; See Bowersock 1965, 48-49.

¹⁰⁴ Cic. *Att.* 5.15.3; 6.1.13 (*Moeragenes certe periit; feci iter per eius possessionem, in qua animal reliquum nullum est*); interestingly enough, Cicero aimed at seizing a fugitive slave of Atticus.

¹⁰⁵ Plutarch even negated any war in Cilicia (Cic. 36.2-6: 'this he accomplished and arranged satisfactorily without war, and seeing that the Cilicians, in view of the Parthian disaster to the Romans and the uprising in Syria, were in an agitated state, he pacified them by his mild government').

people in Cilicia. Regarding this, one should remember that according to the governor, brigands jeopardized the postal service, but not that of the publicani.¹⁰⁶ According to P. Freeman, ‘the province consisted simply of those areas and districts in which the army had, and could, operate’.¹⁰⁷ That is questionable. The control of land and roads did not depend solely on the Roman military apparatus but could be greatly enhanced by securing the loyalty of local powers, be they civic elites, dynasts, or brigands.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the military contribution of the allies in Cicero’s correspondence is negligible. His opinion on the political standing of local magnates was not better. The *auxilia* were not as good as Roman legions and above all were not loyal. Years later, in 43, as he described the desperate march of P. Cornelius Dolabella (cos. 44) in Asia, he wrote that he had recruited the semblance of an army by levying ‘a rabble of Greek soldiers’ out of the people of Tarsus ‘our worst allies’ and Laodicea ‘much more infatuated’ [with Caesar].¹⁰⁸ Peace in Cilicia in 51 should thus only be credited to Cicero’s exemplary government.¹⁰⁹ In fact, Cilician communities remained remarkably loyal to Roman authorities during the following, troubled years. Both Pompey and Caesar could safely recruit auxiliaries there – despite Cicero’s account, Cilician communities were loyal enough and their soldiers good enough for them.¹¹⁰

Cicero’s silence on local elites might have different reasons. In the narrative of his extant correspondence, he could safely omit that subject.¹¹¹ In his discussion of Cicero’s letters, A. Lintott said that they ‘reveal more about his own concern than Cilicia’.¹¹² More persuasively, C. Steel has suggested that much of Cicero’s postures (and contradictions) in orations and letters depended on his audience: he did not want to contradict his counterparts’ ideas and interests. This also explains the apparent inconsistency in the treatment of the military prowess of worthy provincial individuals and provincial communities. As a *primus vir* in Gades, P. Cornelius Balbus provided Roman magistrates (and eventually Caesar) with invaluable military, logistical, and thus political assistance in Spain: Cicero could publicly declare he deserved

¹⁰⁶ Cic. *Fam.* 2.9.1; *Att.* 5.16.1; 5.21.4.

¹⁰⁷ Freeman 1986, 257.

¹⁰⁸ Cic. *Fam.* 12.13.4: *Dolabellam, ut Tarsenses, pessimi socii, ita Laodiceni, multo amentiores, ultro arcessierunt ex quibus utrisque civitatibus Graecorum militum numero speciem exercitus effecit;* regarding Cilician communities’ allegiance to Caesar, see *BAlex* 25-26.

¹⁰⁹ Plut. *Cic.* 36.2-6.

¹¹⁰ Caes. *BC* 3.88; *BAlex* 65; Plut. *Brut.* 4.3.

¹¹¹ As a mere example, F. Santangelo (2010) has noted that even in Appian, who devoted much attention to warfare, attention to local governance is negligible.

¹¹² Lintott 2008, 257.

Roman citizenship.¹¹³ To declare that provincials and their elites were needed to defend the empire and could be granted some voice in the imperial Republic was much more worrying for his audience (and himself).¹¹⁴ Lastly, along with his theory on government, he presented military operations as his own merit and each difficulty made his results even more remarkable. Still, as R. Oniga argued twenty-five years ago, the treatment of foreign people and provincials in Sallust (and one could add Caesar) suggests that Cicero's point of view was not everyone else's: in the last decades of the Republic, foreigners had acquired a central position in the Roman political agenda.¹¹⁵ Especially regarding provincials, their participation in the defence of the empire was felt as needed and their claim to military prowess might have practical consequences on their actual political significance. A century later, M. Valerius Severus, son of Bostar, from Vouibilis, Mauretania, claimed to have persuaded the emperor Claudius to grant his community Roman citizenship, the *ius municipii*, and a set of special rights: he had led his fellow-citizens in the war against Aedemon (AD 42-44).¹¹⁶ Military prowess provided Severus with a leverage *vis-à-vis* the Roman authorities. There is no need to think that Cilician communities acted differently.

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¹¹³ Cic. *Balb.* 2, 9-10,17, 28.

¹¹⁴ Again in the *Pro Balbo*, see 8: *de nostra vero re publica, de nostro imperio, de nostris bellis, de victoria, de salute fundos populos fieri noluerant*.

¹¹⁵ Oniga 1995, 9-10.

¹¹⁶ *AEP* 1916, 42 = 1992, 1943 = *ILAfr* 634.

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