COMO OS INSTRUMENTOS DE MERCADO E A ECONOMIA PODEM CONTRIBUIR PARA A PROTEÇÃO AMIBENTAL
Palavras-chave:
Environmental and Economic Development, Sustainability, Social and Environmental Regulation, Green EconomyResumo
É comum correlacionar o desenvolvimento econômico com a degradação ambiental, costuma ser visto como uma relação de causa e efeito, contudo a questão é um pouco mais complexa, esse artigo pretende abordar de forma mais abrangente a relação entre o desenvolvimento econômico e a salvaguarda ambiental, esse será o objeto central do artigo. Para tratar dessa intrincada relação, não se deve entender a política ambiental somente como uma ferramenta de restrição, a função regulatória ambiental não se limita ao binômio controle/sanção, na sua efetivação deve ser incluído como fatores determinantes a inovação e o crescimento econômico. A economia e, mais particularmente, a promoção de instrumentos baseados no mercado podem, portanto, contribuir para a construção de uma lei e política ambiental mais desenvolvida. São esses instrumentos baseados no mercado que serão o foco central desta contribuição, centralizando-se nas interdependências entre economia e qualidade ambiental, mostrando assim que a economia não é necessariamente uma ameaça à proteção ambiental, pelo contrário, poderia contribuir para a maior proteção do meio ambiente. Dessa forma, o presente trabalho é apresentado em três partes. Inicialmente, será empreendida uma revisão da literatura que analisou empiricamente a relação entre crescimento econômico e qualidade ambiental, conhecida como Environmental Kuznets Curve. Posteriormente, busca-se demonstrar como alguns instrumentos de mercado podem desempenhar um papel central em uma política ambiental eficiente. No tópico seguinte, será realizada uma abordagem desses instrumentos e sua aplicabilidade em realidades distintas, como os países em desenvolvimento, integralizando suas especificidades e condições. Nas “Observações finais”, realiza-se um fechamento debatendo as principais conclusões.
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